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The Palestinian–Israeli conflict, originally a native–settler conflict, is one of the most durable and
intractable conflicts since World War II. While the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis
has started, no final solution has been reached between the two sides, and Israel still occupies most of
the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under these conditions, an interesting
question is raised about normalization between Palestinians and Israelis. Based on data collected in
1994 from a total sample of 270 students in Birzeit University, this article studies the attitudes of
Palestinian students toward cultural normalization with Israel. Despite the fact that Israel still occupies
the Palestinian territories, a major part of Palestinian students support normalizing cultural relations
between Palestinians and Israelis. Support for normalization is significantly associated with social class
or father’s occupation. Students from the working class are more supportive of cultural cooperation
with Israelis than those from other classes. This is explained by the working-class families’ greater
experience of contact with Israelis and a greater dependence on the Israeli labour market.
Introduction
In recent years, and in light of Arab–Israeli
peace negotiations, the question of cultural
normalization between Arabs and Israelis has
been highly debated by intellectuals in Arab
countries as well as those in the occupied
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
This article studies attitudes of Pales-
tinian students toward normalization with
Israel, focusing on the level of support and
on the relationship between attitudes toward
normalization and the respondents’ social
class and other background variables. As 
far as I am aware, this is the first empirical
work on attitudes toward normalization in 
the Palestinian occupied territories. Fur-
thermore, sociological literature on normal-
ization between occupied and occupying
peoples is very limited.
Theoretical Framework
Normalization is closely related to concepts
such as social distance, stereotypes and pre-
judice that describe and explain relations
between ethnic groups, including those
between occupied and occupying peoples. It
is reasonable to assume that people under
occupation keep their social distance from
the occupying people. In a previous article
based on data collected in 1994 (Mi’ari,
1998), I demonstrated that only a small min-
ority of Palestinian students from the West
Bank and Gaza Strip are ready for social
* The author wishes to thank the students of his method-
ology course at Birzeit University for their participation in
designing the research and collecting the data and Dr Lisa
Taraki from Birzeit University for her very useful com-
ments on the first draft. The data used in this article can
be obtained from: http://www.prio.no\\jpr\\main\\htm.
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relations with Israeli Jews. The lower the
intimacy involved, the more ready the
Palestinians are: 16% are ready to work in
same office with Jews, 13% to have Jewish
friends, 11% to live in same neighborhood,
and 5% to marry a Jew. I also showed that
father’s occupation affects readiness: sons of
workers are more ready to have social
relations with Jews than sons of merchants
and, to some extent, sons of farmers. This
relationship was shown to be explained by
the fathers’ previous contact with Jews. The
workers, most of whom are employed in
Israel, have experienced a higher degree of
inter-ethnic contact than other occupational
groups, especially merchants and farmers.
The merchants, by boycotting Israeli goods
and products and being boycotted them-
selves by Israelis during the Palestinian
Uprising which started in December 1987
and continued until the early 1990s, have
hardly experienced contact with Israeli Jews
during that period (Mi’ari, 1998: 59–65).
Farmers, isolated in their villages, also experi-
enced a lower degree of inter-ethnic contact.
Thus, the fathers’ experience of contact may
explain working-class students’ greater readi-
ness to associate socially with Jews.
The contact experience explanation is in
agreement with the finding that Israeli
Arabs’ previous contact with Israeli Jews
affects positively their readiness to associate
socially with them (Miari, 1983: 190–192;
Yogev et al., 1991). Many other studies have
also found that inter-ethnic contact under-
mines negative stereotypes and builds posi-
tive attitudes toward members of other
groups (Amir, 1976; Sigelman & Welch,
1991), particularly when the interacting
people are relatively equal (Desforges et al.,
1991; Robenson & Preston, 1976).
The more positive attitude of working-
class students toward Jews may also be
explained by the resource dependency theory
used by Yuchtman-Yaar and Inbar (1986).
This theory maintains that the relationship
between any two groups is largely deter-
mined by their mutual dependencies with
respect to scarce and valued resources. The
dependent group tends to reduce its social
distance from the other group, while the
dominant group tends to widen its social
distance (Yuchtman-Yaar & Inbar, 1986:
289). The notion of dependency in inter-
ethnic relations is also the core of the asym-
metric contingency approach used by
Hofman (1972) to explain relations between
Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel.
Asymmetric contingency is a condition that
arises when the interacting groups are not
equally dependent upon one another. The
dependent group, relatively speaking, has
more to gain from reciprocity and cognitive
clarity (Hofman, 1972: 249).
Palestinian workers, most of whom work
in Israel, are undoubtedly more dependent
on the Israeli labour market than
Palestinians from other classes, such as
farmers, employees and merchants, most of
whom are employed in the Palestinian
economy. The dependence of Palestinian
workers on Israel is reflected by the fact that
only a small part of these workers can find
employment in the underdeveloped Pales-
tinian economy. Merchants, although they
usually obtain part of their goods and prod-
ucts from Israel, boycotted Israeli goods
during the Palestinian Uprising, and became
less dependent on Israeli economy during
that period (Tamari, 1989). The greater
dependence of Palestinian workers on the
Israeli economy may increase their support
for building normal relations with Israel in
all fields, since they have more to gain from
normalization (primarily work opportunities
and improvement of work conditions).
The contact experience and the depen-
dency approaches are not contradictory, but
rather are closely related. For example, a
Palestinian worker employed in Israel, and
who is more dependent on Israeli labour
market, is more likely to experience various
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forms of inter-ethnic contact (such as
contact at work, in a shop, in a bus or in the
street). The present article is not designed to
separate empirically these two approaches.
The Arab–Israeli Conflict
The Arab–Israeli conflict, and its core, the
Palestinian–Israeli conflict, is one of the
most durable and intractable territorial con-
flicts since World War II. With roots in the
early Zionist colonization in Palestine,
which started in the late 19th century and
intensified during the British Mandate
period between the two World Wars, this
conflict is clearly territorial in the sense that
Palestine’s indigenous Arabs (backed by
neighbouring Arab countries) and
Palestine’s Jewish settlers (backed by world
Jewish organizations) claim rights on the
same territory.
By the end of the British Mandate period
in 1948, the Palestine’s Jewish settler min-
ority, forming about 35% of Palestine’s total
population and owning only about 7% of its
total area, called for the establishment of a
Jewish state in Palestine. Palestine’s Arab
majority opposed the establishment of a
Jewish state and called for an independent
Palestinian state in which Muslims,
Christians, and Jews could live in equality.
The first Arab–Jewish (or Israeli) war in
1948 led to the establishment of the state of
Israel in one part of Palestine. The West
Bank was annexed by Jordan, and a third
part of Palestine, the Gaza Strip, was admin-
istered by Egypt.
The 1948 war escalated the Arab–Israeli
conflict and other wars followed (in 1956,
1967, 1973 and 1982). The worst outcome
for the Arabs was in the 1967 war, as a result
of which Israel occupied the remaining parts
of Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
portions of neighboring Arab countries, the
Egyptian Sinai peninsula, and the Syrian
Golan Heights.
A recent study on changes in the
Arab–Israeli conflict shows that this conflict
has wound down after 1973. The gravity of
the crisis has been reduced, the number of
crisis actors has become smaller, and the
level of military and political involvement by
the Superpowers has decreased (Ben-Yehuda
& Sandler, 1998: 102). This trend has been
accompanied by a move to more peaceful
models of conflict resolution. The first peace
agreement between Israel and any Arab
country was signed in 1978 with Egypt. In
September 1993, the Declaration of
Principles (DOP) was signed between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) to set up a transitional system of 
self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. In October 1994, a peace agreement
was signed between Israel and Jordan. The
peace process has been reversed since the
Likud party came to power in Israel in
November 1995. The Syrian–Israeli and
Lebanese–Israeli peace negotiations have not
been pursued further. The DOP has been
only partially implemented, so that the
Palestinian Authority operates only in a
small part of the occupied Palestinian terri-
tories.
Several studies of international disputes
illustrate that territorial disputes are very
likely to escalate to wars, to recur in a shorter
period of time, and to evolve into enduring
rivalries (Hensel, 1996; Huth, 1996; Kocs,
1995). The territorial issue would seem to be
one important reason for the escalation and
exceptional duration of the Palestinian–
Israeli conflict. Both the Palestinians and
Israelis claim historical rights to today’s
Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The Palestinian–Israeli conflict differs
from most other territorial conflicts since
World War II (such as Iran versus the
United Arab Emirates, Greece versus
Turkey, and China versus India, where the
states involved in each case disagree on the
location of the boundary line) in having its
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origin in a native–settler conflict, that is
between the indigenous Arab population of
Historical Palestine and its Jewish settlers.
This aspect of the conflict makes it more
complex and difficult to resolve.
In an analysis of the dispute dataset gen-
erated by the Correlates of War project,
Jones et al. (1996) showed that the duration
of disputes is positively associated with the
escalation of hostility (from threat to war),
the number of states involved, and the par-
ticipation (or involvement) of major powers
in the dispute. All three factors are found in
the Palestinian–Israeli conflict: the escala-
tion of the conflict to five wars, the direct
involvement of a number of Arab countries
(especially Egypt, Jordan, and Syria), and
the involvement of major powers in the
conflict (particularly the UK and France in
the Sinai War of 1956). The two Super-
powers, the USA and the USSR, were also
politically involved in the conflict. All three
of these factors have been weakened after
1973, and even more so after the end of the
Cold War, but a great deal of their influence
remains.
Normalization
The pursuit of normalization in Arab–Israeli
relations is traditionally viewed from dif-
ferent perspectives by Israelis and Arabs. The
Israeli perspective considers normalization as
a basic strategic goal, and encourages
cooperation with Arab countries in various
fields, especially in economics, politics, and
people-to-people contact. The Israelis actu-
ally aim to achieve normal multidimensional
relations with Arab countries before, or even
without, resolving the main issues in the
Arab–Israeli conflict. The Arab perspective,
in contrast, maintains that normalization
with Israel should begin with the resolution
of key political issues, and should proceed at
a rate that matches political criteria. A
popular theme among Arabs is that normal-
ization should not come until Israel gives up
its occupation of Arab and Palestinian terri-
tories (Bowker, 1996: 87). The Arab per-
spective of normalization undoubtedly
strengthened the Palestinian position and
created a sort of balance. Israel’s military
power was balanced by the Arabs’ rejection
of normalizing relations.
Governmental attempts to normalize
Arab–Israeli relations were made in the last
two decades with the signing of a separate
peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in
1978. The two governments have cooper-
ated in tourism, trade, agriculture, and tech-
nology. More steps toward normalization
have been taken since the signing of the
DOP between Israel and the PLO in
September 1993. Despite the obstacles in
the peace process, Israeli and Palestinian
officials have cooperated in certain fields,
especially in security and the ‘fight against
terrorism’. The signing of the DOP opened
the door for Jordan to sign a peace agree-
ment with Israel in October 1994 and to
cooperate in trade, tourism, and industry. It
also encouraged a few Arab countries, such
as Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, and Oman, to
exchange with Israel liaison offices or
‘interest sections’, a possible first step toward
diplomatic relations. Israel and Arab coun-
tries have also participated in several fora
and conferences held in the region, such as
the First Women’s Summit Conference held
in Casablanca in May 1994 and the Middle
East Economic Conference held annually
since 1994.
Despite governmental efforts at normal-
ization, almost all associations of intellec-
tuals in Arab countries reject any
normalization with Israel as long as Israel
occupies Arab land and does not recognize
the Palestinian peoples’ right to self-determi-
nation. The General Union of Arab Authors
and Writers, a pan-Arab organization,
decided in 1997 to freeze the membership of
the Union of Palestinian Writers and
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Journalists because of its support of normal-
ization (Al-Quds, 1997).1 Similarly, local
Arab associations of writers in almost all
Arab countries, including Egypt and Jordan,
oppose cooperation with Israelis. At its
meeting in 1994, the Association of
Jordanian Writers, for example, decided: (1)
to refuse to meet Israeli intellectuals in
Jordan or Israel or abroad; (2) to refuse to
participate in any Arab forum (or inter-
national forum held on Arab land) in which
Israelis participate; (3) to refuse to partici-
pate in any international forum which aims
to normalize Arab relations with Israel; (4)
to refuse to participate in any cultural,
artistic, or research activity in which Israelis
participate, or which is held in Israel or the
occupied Arab territories; (5) to refuse to
conduct any cultural, informational, or pol-
itical visit to Israel or the occupied Arab ter-
ritories upon an invitation from Israel or
from the Palestinian Authority; and (6) to
treat any Jordanian or Arab writer who vio-
lates these recommendations as an Israeli
with regard to the cultural boycott (Shabana,
1994: 161–162). Well-known Arab intellec-
tuals who support normalization, such as the
writers Tawfiq Al-Hakim and Najib Mahfuz
from Egypt, Zlaikha Abu Risha from Jordan
and the poet Adonis from Syria, are attacked
in the press (Shabana, 1994: 159). In
extreme cases, the supporters of cultural nor-
malization have been expelled from their
organizations, which was the case with the
Jordanian comedians Nabil Sawalha and
Hisham Yanos (Peri, 1997).
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories
seem to be more supportive of normalization
with Israel than other Arabs. Most
Palestinian associations in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, including the two unions of
Palestinian writers, support, or at least do
not oppose, normalization, and in many
cases cooperate with their Israeli coun-
terparts. Many individual Palestinian in-
tellectuals have taken steps towards normal-
ization, such as joint research and symposia,
the formation of circles such as the
Israel/Palestine Center for Research and
Information and the Palestine–Israel Journal
of Politics, Economics and Culture, and joint
theatre performances which have been
advertised in Arabic newspapers (Al-Quds,
12 June 1994).
Before the DOP, and especially during
the Palestinian Uprising, cultural cooper-
ation with Israelis was condemned by most
Palestinian academics. After signing the
DOP in 1993, the attitude toward normal-
ization has changed drastically. Today,
several Palestinian universities and research
centres cooperate with Israelis in various
projects, including research and training. A
number of well-known activists who
opposed normalization a few years ago are
currently taking part in it. Opposition to
normalization in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip seems to be limited to a minority
of intellectuals. Rawia Shawwa, a member of
the Palestinian Legislative Council, com-
plains that normalization in the absence of a
resolution of the conflict gives the world an
impression that peace is present where it is
not. Normalization can only take place
between two equal partners in peace, and
not between an occupying force and an
occupied people (Shawwa, 1997: 10).
I suggest that contact between Israelis and
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and
Palestinian economic and political depen-
dency on Israel have increased support for
normalization. This is investigated empiri-
cally below.
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1 The Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists was
originally formed, outside Palestine, by the PLO and cur-
rently is dominated by the Palestinian Authority. The
Union of Palestinian Writers was formed under Israeli
occupation by local writers to represent Palestinian writers
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Only the first organiz-
ation had a membership in the Union of Arab Authors and
Writers. This membership was suspended in 1997 for
support of normalization. The other organization, known
as the local organization, also supports, or at least does not
oppose, normalization with Israel.
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Data and Methods
The Sample
Since the mid-1970s, seven Palestinian uni-
versities have been established in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the total
number of students in these universities is
about 30,000. Palestinian students have
always been the most active force in resisting
Israeli occupation. Their political activities,
taking the form of strikes, demonstrations,
and violent confrontations with Israeli
forces, overshadowed those of trade unions,
professional associations, women’s groups,
and other organizations (Sahliyeh, 1988:
134). The students’ fight against Israeli
occupation reached its climax in the uprising
which began in 1987. Between 1988 and
1991, students formed about 18% of the
Palestinian administrative detainees and
about 23% of Palestinians were expelled
from their homeland by Israeli authorities
(Mi’ari, 1994: 70–72).
The data for this study were collected in
June 1994 using a systematic random sample
of 270 Palestinian students from Birzeit
University in the West Bank, which com-
prised about 11% of the total university stu-
dents at that time. The data were collected
two or three weeks after the start of imple-
menting the Palestinian–Israeli agreement,
including the entrance of Palestinian police
forces to the regions of Palestinian self-rule
in Gaza and Jericho. The sample was selected
randomly by computer from lists obtained
from the registrar’s office of the university.
The students were interviewed individu-
ally through a structured questionnaire,
which was composed of questions measuring
several background variables, self-identity,
readiness for inter-ethnic contact, support of
normalization, political behavior and atti-
tudes toward the Palestinian–Israeli agree-
ment. The interviews were conducted by
students in a sociological methodology
course taught by the author.
Measurement
The dependent variable, support for normal-
ization, was measured by the following ques-
tions:
(1) Do you support or oppose holding scien-
tific conferences in which Palestinians
and Israelis participate?
(2) Do you support or oppose holding pol-
itical conferences in which Palestinians and
Israelis participate?
(3) Do you support or oppose students from
the West Bank and Gaza Strip studying in
Israeli universities?
(4) Do you support or oppose Jewish students
from Israel studying in universities in the
West Bank?
(5) Do you support or oppose the establish-
ment of a joint Palestinian–Israeli theatre?
The answers to each question were mea-
sured over four categories, ranging from
‘strongly oppose’ to ‘strongly support’. By
summing up the scores of the five ques-
tions, an index was compiled, ranging from
5 (those who replied ‘strongly oppose’ to
all five questions) to 20 (those who
answered ‘strongly support’ to all five ques-
tions).
The background variables included in
the study were gender, father’s schooling
(recoded by assigning the mid-points of
grouped categories of years of schooling),
family income (similarly recoded), religion
(Muslim versus Christian), religiosity (from
‘not religious at all’ to ‘very religious’), fight
against occupation (a three-point scale based
on the questions ‘were you arrested during
the Palestinian uprising?’ and ‘have you
been injured by Israeli forces?’), place of res-
idence (dummy variables for village, refugee
camp, and town as the reference category),
party support (dummy variables for Islamic
organizations, Marxist organizations, inde-
pendent candidates, and Fatah as the refer-
ence category), support for the Palestinian–
Israeli agreement (four categories ranging
j ournal  o f PE AC E RE S E A RC H volume 36 / number 3 / may 1999344
 at SAGE Publications on December 7, 2012jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
   
from ‘strongly oppose’ to ‘strongly
support’).
The main independent variable of the
study is father’s occupation, with dummy
variables representing farmer, employee,
merchant, and worker as the reference cat-
egory.
The results are first presented as a uni-
variate frequency analysis of the indepen-
dent variables, followed by a bivariate
cross-table analysis of support for normaliza-
tion by father’s occupation, and sub-
sequently a multiple regression analysis of
the attitudes toward normalization as a func-
tion of the independent variables.
Results
Independent Variables
The majority of the respondents are male
(60%), Muslims (85%), and from families
with a high socio-economic status: Father’s
average length of schooling is 8.4 years, the
average family income is 486 Jordanian
dinars (about US$675), and most of the
fathers work in white collar occupations or
in a trade (35% are employees, 24% mer-
chants, 23% workers, 15% farmers, and 3%
other). The respondents are moderate in
their religiosity (a mean of 2.8 in a five-point
scale ranging from 1 to 5). Half of the
respondents come from cities or towns, and
the other half come from villages (39%) or
refugee camps (11%). In response to the
question ‘if general elections were held to the
Palestinian Council, which party would you
support?’, 41% would support Fatah, the
ruling party, 26% Marxist organizations
(especially the Popular Front, Democratic
Front and People’s party), 12% Islamic
organizations (Hamas or Islamic Jihad), and
21% independent candidates. Some 67% of
the respondents say that they have not
fought against the Israeli occupation (not
arrested or injured by Israeli forces), 23%
have fought moderately (either arrested or
injured) and 10% have fought actively
(arrested and injured). Finally, the respon-
dents are not clearly supportive of the
Palestinian–Israeli agreement: 49% support
the agreement and 51% oppose it. The
agreement is supported primarily by Fatah
supporters, and opposed by most Islamic
and Marxist organizations.
Attitudes Toward Normalization and
Father’s Occupation
Table I shows that a great majority of 
the respondents support holding scientific
and political conferences attended by
Palestinians and Israelis, a smaller majority
supports Palestinian students from the West
Bank and Gaza Strip studying in Israeli uni-
versities, slightly more than a half of the
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Table I. Palestinian Students’ (%) Support of Normalization with Israel by Father’s Occupation (1994)
Field of Normalization Farmer Worker Employee Merchant Total p
Joint Scientific Conferences 75 76 83 73 77 0.46
Joint Political Conferences 69 73 77 71 73 0.72
Palestinian Students Studying 65 75 69 67 69 0.67
in an Israeli University
Israeli Students Studying 55 57 54 43 51 0.41
in a Palestinian University
Joint Palestinian–Israeli Theatre 33 44 45 52 43 0.30
Normalization Index 33 49 46 42 44 0.43
The percentages include the respondents who answered ‘strongly support’ or ‘support’. The remaining respondents
answered ‘oppose’ or ‘strongly oppose’. The respondents answering father’s occupation as ‘other’ were excluded (3%).
The normalization index sums up the scores on the five questions and ranges between 5 and 20. Figures indicate the
percentage of the respondents scoring 15–20 on this index.
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respondents support Israeli Jews studying in
Palestinian universities and a large minority
support the establishment of a joint
Palestinian–Israeli theatre. The respondents’
support for normalization seems to increase
in fields where the intimacy involved is low.
Table I also shows that respondents
belonging to different occupational cat-
egories do not differ significantly in their
support of normalization in the various fields
or in their scores on the normalization index,
although sons of workers appear to be a little
more supportive than others. However, the
relationship may be obscured by other sup-
pressor variables (Babbie, 1983: 400–402).
Table II presents a model of multiple
regression coefficients, estimating the effects
of several independent variables in support of
normalization. It shows that four variables
are significantly correlated with support of
normalization: father’s occupation (workers
are more supportive of normalization), party
support (Fatah supporters are more sup-
portive), religiosity (negatively correlated)
and support of the Palestinian–Israeli agree-
ment (positively correlated).
Sons of workers tend to be more sup-
portive of normalization than others,
especially sons of merchants and farmers,
after controlling for all other independent
variables. This finding could be explained by
fathers’ previous contact with Israelis and a
dependency on the Israeli labor market. The
finding that Fatah supporters favor normal-
ization with Israel more than Islamists and
Marxists is in support of the policy of Fatah,
headed by Yassir Arafat. The negative corre-
lation of religiosity with support of normal-
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Variables Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Gender (High Score is Male) –0.173 (0.117)
Religion (High Score is Christian) –0.154 (0.144)
Father’s Schooling –0.004 (0.014) –0.022
Family Income –0.000 (0.000) –0.020
Religiosity –0.171 (0.055)** –0.228**
Fight Against Occupation –0.103 (0.085) –0.083
Place of Residence (Town is Reference)
Village –0.053 (0.129)
Refugee camp –0.372 (0.199)*




Party Support (Fatah is Reference)
Islamic organizations –0.403 (0.207)*
Marxist organizations –0.768 (0.168)**
Independent –0.029 (0.130)
Support for the Palestinian–Israeli Agreement –0.230 (0.076)** –0.248**
Constant –2.981 (0.346)
R 2 0.381 (0.675) –0.381 (0.675)
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standardized coefficients for dummy variables lacked substantive interest and
were excluded.
*p # 0.05, **p # 0.01, ***p # 0.001.
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ization is in agreement with a previous
article which demonstrated that religous
respondents tend to be more prejudiced
against Jews than non-religious respondents
(Mi’ari, 1997: 119). As expected, respon-
dents who support the Palestinian–Israeli
agreement support normalization more than
those who oppose the agreement.
An unexpected finding is that fighters and
non-fighters do not differ significantly in
their support of cooperation with Israelis.
Palestinians with experience in fighting
against the Israeli occupation are only a little
more negative towards cooperation than
others.
Conclusion
A relatively large part of the respondents
support normalization with Israel despite the
fact that Israel still occupies Palestinian and
Arab territories. Since the data were col-
lected in June 1994, less than one year after
the signing of the Palestinian–Israeli agree-
ment, it seems that the start of the peace
process between the Palestinians and Israelis
bolstered Palestinian support of normaliza-
tion with Israel. It is my impression that the
Palestinians’ support of normalization has
increased further in recent years, although
there are no data to support this.
Support for cultural cooperation with
Israelis does not indicate a desire to associate
socially with them, as shown in my earlier
work (Mi’ari, 1998). The greater intimacy
involved in social normalization may explain
this finding. Support for cultural cooper-
ation between Palestinians and Israelis also
differs according to the intimacy involved in
joint cultural activity. Support is higher for
cultural activities in which the intimacy
involved between participating Palestinians
and Israelis is low, such as conferences, than
for activities in which the intimacy involved
is relatively high, such as the theatre.
No comparable empirical studies have
been performed in Arab countries as far as I
am aware, but a greater support for normal-
ization among intellectual associations in
Palestine compared with elsewhere in the
Arab world might also be explained by their
greater contact with Israelis and their pol-
itical and economic dependency on Israel.
Generalizing from the present case, I
venture to suggest that occupied peoples
support normalization with occupying
peoples because they expect to gain, politi-
cally and economically, from normalization.
Support for normalization may increase
when a peace process begins and the two
peoples interact with each other. Those who
have experienced more contact with the
occupying people (especially at work), and
those who are economically dependent upon
them, support normalization more than
others. Students from the working class are
more supportive of normalization with Israel
because working-class families have a greater
experience of contact with Jews and a greater
dependency on the Israeli labor market.
More research is needed to differentiate
between these two explanations, contact
experience and dependency.
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